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I.  INTRODUCTION
The contemporary crisis  in rural America has many roots, but four can be
singled out  for particular emphasis.
1)  Generational change has given us a population in which the majority
has no personal recollection of  the history of past financial crises.
2)  Decision-making  in agriculture has been dominated for four decades
by a preoccupation with capital gains and  "rent  seeking",  and a
neglect  of  cash-flow and profit seeking.  Farm land values rose almost
without interruption  from  the mid-193
0 's to 1981.
3)  Well-publicized world food  shortages in  the  1960's  and  1970's  created
a belief  in a virtually unlimited  export  demand for U.S.  food products.
4)  There was an inadequate understanding of  the degree to which the United
States was being  integrated into  the world economy, and  of  its  trans-
formation from a creditor  into a debtor nation.
These  four roots of rural  crisis were fed by  tax and fiscal policies  that
stimulated over-investment in land, buildings, and equipment capital,  and  by
monetary policies  that contributed  to  real rates  of  interest  that in  the  1970's
were  the lowest  and  in  the  1980's have been  the highest  in more  than a century.
From 1973  to  1981 the real rate of  interest on Federal  Land Bank mortages  (the
nominal rate minus the  inflation  rate) was negative in 18  of  the 32 quarters.
In effect, gasoline was poured  on  the  fire  of anticipated capital  gains.
From 1971  to  1981 farm land values rose  four-fold nationally and  increased
4.5  to  5.5  fold  in major grain-producing areas  of  the Mid-West and Great Plains.
The turn-around  from 1981  to  1985 has exceeded any previous  four-year  decline
in  land values in  the  Grain Belt  for which we have records.
Nationally, from 1981  to  1985 farm land values fell  19 percent in nominal
(i.e.  current) dollars.  In  real terms  (current dollars deflated with the  CPI
index),  the decline from 1981  to  1985 was  29 percent.  In  the  Corn Belt, Lake
States,  and Northern Plains declines were much more severe.  In nominal dollars,
from  1981  to  1985  land values  in Iowa fell  47  percent.  In real  purchasing power
(1967=100),  the decline was 54 percent.  Real declines  in  the Lake States from
1981  to  1985 were 42  percent for Minnesota, 37  percent for Wisconsin and  30
percent  for Michigan (USDA, 1985, A).  Declines  on this  scale have wiped out
asset values and  credit capacity to  an extent  that  fully justifies  the use of
the  term crisis  to  describe the agricultural  situation.
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II.  THE DETERIORATING SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITY
OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
The dominant problem facing agricultural  producers in  the mid-1980's is
survival.  Historically, the  great  strength of  a farm structure composed of
many relatively small units was  the ability to absorb economic or weather-
induced  crises by suppressing family levels of  living.  When  labor was a major
input in farming, the willingness of  producers to  tolerate low labor returns
measured their shock-absorbing capacity.  Until  the  1960's,  labor remained the
largest  single input  cost  in  U.S.  farming.  Faced with economic  adversity,
large shocks  could still be absorbed by underrewarding labor  (Table 1).
Survival characteristics have changed drastically for  farms.  Underreward-
ing  the  labor input  no  longer offers much shock absorbing capacity.  The  labor
share of  input cost  is  too  small,  averaging 13  to  14 percent  in  the 1980's for
U.S.  farming as a whole.  In  many cash-crop  operations,  the proportion is
substantially lower.
Some shock absorbing capacity exists  in  the possibility of varying fertil-
izers and chemical  inputs, but  together  they accounted  for only about  10 percent
of  the  cost of  total farm inputs in  1983.  Taxes and  interest costs are also
significant,  but  in  1975-83  they were at  about  the  same  levels of relative
importance as they were in  1910-20, i.e.  averaging about 8 to 9 percent  of  the
cost of  total  inputs.
The only two large items of  input  costs that  can be varied in  the  1980's
to  absorb economic shock are land costs, at  about  25 percent of  total costs,
and mechanical and machinery expenses, which in 1983 accounted for  one-third
of  total  input costs.
In contemporary agriculture, capacity  to absorb shock depends  critically
on a reduction in  land  and machinery costs.  The severity of  this  reduction
is acute  in regions  in which agriculture  is  primarily focused  on field crops
of bread grains, feed grains,  oil seeds  or cotton.  These were  the regions in
which  land value increases were  the greatest in  the  1970's.  The psychological
effect  of this  shattering of  expectations gives  the rural  crisis of  the  1980's
one of  its most  distinctive characteristics.
The largest fraction of  current  farm input  costs  is accounted for by
mechanical  equipment and farm machinery.  Any attempts to  cushion the  shock of
economic reverses  in farming by reducing  current expenditures must focus on
this  class  of  inputs.  This is  also occurring.  Bankruptcy and merger activity
are prominentamong farm machinery manufacturers, and  farm machinery dealers
are going out of business  throughout the  farm belts.  Tractor manufacturers
in  the U.S.  in  1983  operated at  only 22  percent of  capacity, and  combine manu-
facturers at  14  percent  of capacity  (USDA, 1984,  p. 31).  In  1949,  there were
1492  farm equipment  dealers  in Minnesota and South Dakota;  in  1984, only 600
were still  in business  (Austin,  1985).-3-
TABLE 1:  U.S.,  PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION  OF FARM  INPUTSA/
FEED,
SEED,
FARM  MECIH.  LIVE-
REAL  AND MA-  AGR.  STOCK  TAXES,
YEAR  LABOR  ESTATE  CHINERY  CHEM.  PURCH.  INT.  MSCL.
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 1935-39 WEIGHTS
1910  53.4  20.2  8.5  1.7  3.2  8.3  4.7
1915  51.6  19.8  9.8  1.6  3.0  9.3  4.9
1920  50.0  18.5  11.8  2.1  3.9  8.8  4.9
1925  48.9  17.8  12.0  2.3  4.6  9.7  4.7
1930  46.2  17.7  14.1  2.8  4.4  10.4  4.4
1935,  47.0  19.2  12.9  2.7  4.1  9.7  4.4
1939  42.8  18.4  14.7  3.4  6.2  10.3  4.2
1947-49 WEIGHTS
1939  54.4  17.0  10.1  1.9  6.5  7.0  3.1
1945  48.0  15.8  14.3  3.2  8.2  7.4  3.1
1950  38.1  16.7  20.3  4.7  9.4  7.5  3.3
1955  32.0  16.4  23.3  6.2  10.7  7.9  3.5
1957-59 WEIGHTS
1955  32.2  19.4  24.0  4.4  9.0  7.7  3.2
1960  26.5  19.4  25.0  5.8  10.9  . 8.6  3.8
1965  20.4  19.7  24.9  9,1  12.5  9.4  4.0
1967-69 WEIGHTS
1965  23.2  23.6  26.8  5.3  6.7  10.8  3.5
1970  19.0  23.0  28,3  8.0  7.4  10.8  3.5
1975  16.7  21.8  31.5  8.8  7.1  10.8  3,3
1976  16.0  21.6  31.3  9.6  7.4  10.5  3.6
1976-78 WEIGHTS
1975  17,1  24.1  33.0  8.0  6.2  8.3  3.2
1980  13.8  23.6  33.5  11.0  6.9  7.8  3.7
1983  12.8  25.2  32.5  9,6  6,9  8,5  4.6
a/  National Economics Div.,  Economic Research Service, U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture, Washington, D. C.,  Feb.  1985.-5-
III.  THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF EXCESS PRODUCTION
The aspects of  the consumption of  capital noted above  are  the symptoms
of  distress.  The primary cause  is overproduction.  There has been wide-
spread unwillingness  to  face this  issue squarely.  Throughout history, and
for the  majority of  the world's population  today,  the farm problem has been
one  of  too  little food,  not  too much.  Dramatic reports  of food  shortages,
malnutrition and famine are daily reminders of  the existence in major popu-
lations  of  food needs without effective demand.  In  the United States  farm and
non-farm people alike have misinterpreted  this need as  evidence of potential
export markets.
This misinterpretation is  reinforced by the entire  information  system
available  to agriculture.  Increasing the volume of  physical output has  been
an almost universal goal  of  the agricultural universities,  experiment stations,
and extension activities serving agriculture  in  the public  sector.  This has
been even more characteristic of  private firms and  information services  supply-
ing  inputs or  information to  agriculture or marketing  its  products.  Agri-
business  interests benefit directly from a high volume of  farm output,  and
typically avoid or oppose any discussion of production controls.
The strangled nature of public discussion of  alternative ways  to  reduce
farm output has encountered even greater political opposition during  the
current crisis.  This has been due  to doctrinal  and  ideological positions
taken by the present  administration of  the  federal government.  The evaporation
of hopes of  salvation  through expanded foreign markets occurred at  the peak of
a rejection of  any programs  involving greater governmental  participation in
production controls.  Given the number, distribution, and relatively  small
scale of American farms, no  power short of  governmental action  or brutal
price declines could hope  to bring down output on  the  scale  needed.  This
administration has opted for price declines, although its  conviction is  wavering.
The prospect for  the next three years  is  for  delay, a death-bed conversion,
and election-bred efforts at  the last minute  to  introduce dramatic programs to
reduce  output.  The  ill-conceived and disastrously expensive PIK program of
1983-4  is unfortunately the  only model on  which to base a forecast of  probable
political responses  to the present  crisis.
The  prospect  is  further confused by a persistent failure  to distinguish
between the problem of  too many farmers, and the problem of  too much land and
capital committed  to production.  For at  least forty years  the problem of
increasing the farmers'  income  has been viewed simplistically as a problem of
too many farmers.  The  solution  has been personalized by focusing on  the with-
drawal  of  labor  and  the elimination  of  farm firms.
It  is  arguable that the withdrawal  of  labor has  gone  far  enough.  Exces-
sive labor costs are not propelling  the present  crisis,  and  it  will not be
resolved by eliminating farmers.  The  more critical question is what will be
done with  the land of  the  farmers who  leave  or are  forced out.  Wiping out
farm firms will leave untouched  the problem of  too much land  in production,
and may even make  it worse.  The farm firms that  are being wiped out  in  the
1980's  are not concentrated  at  the margins of  cultivation, nor  are  they grouped
at  the bottom end of  the  scale of  farm sizes.  Their  land will  remain  in
production,  in  any  scenario  that rests on  output control by commodity price
declines.-6-
Some program of  land use control must be embedded  in any prescription
for  the solution  to  the farm problem of  the 1980's.  The debate, when focused,
is between a system that  achieves restrictions on production by creating
private firms  large enough to internalize  the cost of  control, and a system
that  attempts control through some combination of  regulations on land use  and
marketing that  involve a substantial element of  public authority.  It will be
a service  to  the entire economy to  bring this issue  squarely into the  center
of  the  current discussions of  farm policy.
Either alternative involves  elements that are distasteful,  and uncertainty
that cannot  be reduced to  calculable risk.  The broad  issue is  clear enough.
Do we want production control  in agriculture  to  be  achieved by firms big enough
to  pass  on  the  cost of control  through  the price system in  the form of  higher
food prices?  Or  is  the public  interest best  served by controls achieved by
the  selective use of tax revenues to  bring about  an orderly withdrawal of
productive resources from agriculture, while maintaining reserve capacity that
can  serve as  insurance  against unexpected shocks?-7-
IV.  WHY  BE CONCERNED ABOUT FARM PROBLEMS?
For the nation  as a whole, the farm population  in  1983 was 5,788,000,
or  2.46 percent of  the U.S.  population.  This tremendously understates the
significance of  the  farm sector  in the  total economy.  The most direct
measure of  this understatement  is provided by the  cost of  food.
The proportion of  total disposable personal income  spent on food in  the
United  States is one of  the lowest  in  the world, at  15.1 percent  in  1984.
This includes  total food and non-alcoholic beverages.  Beverages alone vary
from 3 to 4 percent of  total expenditure, and  the most important  of  these
(coffee, tea,  cocoa) are imported.  If we deduct  consumer expenditure on
imported food and beverages, only 12  to  13  percent of  consumer disposable
income is  spent on food of domestic U.S.  origin.  This makes the  consumers'
cost of  the nutritional content  of  the U.S.  food supply  the lowest  in the
world, in  terms of  the proportion of  consumer income that must be  surrendered
to obtain it.  The most obvious reason why city people have an interest  in
what happens  on the farm concerns  the cost  of food  (USDA, 1985, B).
Food costs  since the  1960's have gone up less  than any of the  other
major components of  the  Consumer Price  Index  (CPI).  Using 1967  as  100,  the
CPI for  the US  as  a whole stood at  322.2  in June 1985, while food and beverage
costs stood at  300.6.  In virtually every month of  the past  4 years the  cost
of  food has  gone up  less than the federal rate of  inflation, and thus  has
served as  a brake on inflation.
This  record of  a stable and low-cost  food supply has  been achieved by
a group  of  relatively small to medium scale farm businesses that  have combined
high technology with a high level of management and a low rate  of  return, to
labor, capital and land.  This has been possible because farm businesses have
been the outstanding example of worker-managed firms.  They have received a
part  of  their reward through their equity in  the business.  This has  been
sufficient  to hold labor and capital  in agriculture at  rates  of return that
are well below the returns required  if  farming were organized on industrial
lines, with wage labor.
Most importantly, farm firms have been small enough to be flexible, and
quick to  adapt  to  change.  Although agriculture historically has been regarded
as  a tradition-bound industry, the  outstanding feature of  American agriculture
is  the rapidity with which  it  has modernized its capital stock and  its  pro-
production techniques.  Given  the heavy hand  or  tradition in  agriculture,  it
would not have been surprising  to  find  agriculture lagging  in  the race  to
achieve productivity gains.  In fact, productivity gains  in agriculture have
consistently outrun productivity gains  in industry for  the past half-century.
In  the period from 1948  to  1981,  the annual rate of  increase in productivity
in U.S. agriculture per manhour worked was  over  6.0 percent;  in manufacturing
it was under 3.0 percent.  This  is  the  basic explanation of  the continued low
cost  of the American food supply  (Table 2).-8-
Table  2
Estimated Trend Labor Productivity Growth By
Sectors  in the United States
1948-19812/
Private Business  Average Annual Trend
Sectors  Productivity Growthb/
1948-68  1968-81
(%  per year)
Service Producing  3.0  1.5
Goods Producing  3.0  2.1
Manufacturing  2.9  2.8
Farming  6.0  6.3
Private Business
Sector as a Whole  3.3  1.8
a/  Charles S. Morris, "The Productivity  'Slowdown':  A Sectoral
Analyses",  Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas
City, April 1984, p. 13.
b/  Trend productivity growth  is defined as  the growth in output
per manhour worked  if all resources  in the economy were fully
employed at desired  levels  (Morris, p. 4).-11-
These policies  raised credit costs, choked  back exports,  and precipitated
a deflation in  the  agricultural  sector that ranks with a scale of  destruction
of  capital values  that  other nations have only experienced  in  time of war.
It  can  in truth be  regarded as a delayed response  to  the inflation that was
guaranteed by the decision in  the  1960's  to  engage  in the Viet Nam war without
raising taxes  to hold back demand.  Agriculture, heavy industry, and the
export sector are now paying  the cost of  that mistaken decision.
The mistake was nation-wide.  It  does  not  seem unreasonable to  argue that
the  cost of repairing  that mistake should also  be assumed  at  the national level.
The argument  should not be  couched  in  terms of  the merits of  further subsidies
to  a class of producers believed or not believed  to be deserving.  Instead,  it
should rest on the value to  the nation  of maintaining a stock of  human and
physical capital in  an agriculture  that has  served  it  well.
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